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In 2011, then-Public Safety Minister Vic Toews issued “ministerial directions” to 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
and the Canada Border Services Agency on “information sharing with foreign 
entities”.1  This innocuous title betrayed little of these administrative instruments’ 
actual content.  The directions focused on information sharing “when doing so 
may give rise to a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual”.  They were, 
in other words, new policies on the thorny issue of information-sharing and 
torture, a question that has galvanized Canadian court cases and driven numerous 
high profile public inquiries since 9/11.  In contrast with the recommendations in 
some of these inquiries, the directions were permissive of information-sharing that 
might induce (or be the product of) mistreatment.  While they limited and 
controlled how that sharing might take place, they did not preclude it absolutely. 
When acquired by journalist Jim Bronskill in 2012 under access to 
information law, the directions prompted a brief chorus of public condemnation.  
Subsequently, Professor Kent Roach penned a critical academic editorial on the 
topic in 20122 and the Canadian Bar Association tabled a resolution condemning 
                                                
1  These three agencies constitute Canada’s chief security and intelligence bodies.  A fourth 
agency, Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), may also be implicated in 
intelligence sharing of the sort discussed here.  It is, however, not an agency within the portfolio of 
the Minister of Public Safety and there is no public record on what policies, if any, govern 
information sharing and torture between CSEC and its partners. 
2  Kent Roach, “The Dangerous Game of Complicity in Torture,” (2012) 58 (3 & 4) Criminal 
Law Quarterly 303 
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the measures in 2013.3  But for most part, the directions have sunk into relative 
obscurity, remaining part of the Canada’s national security policy framework.  
And yet, in trying to walk the fine line between principle and realism in the 
administration of Canada’s approach to torture, they continue to raise pressing 
moral and legal questions. 
This Article aims to reignite discussion of these policies and their 
controversial content, relying in large measure on documents obtained by this 
author directly or through journalistic researchers under access to information law.  
It does so in three parts.  Part I discusses the dilemmas raised when information is 
shared between human rights-observing and abusing states.  Part II examines the 
legal parameters within which both “in-bound” and “out-bound” information-
sharing takes place and describes in detail past ministerial directions and CSIS 
operational policies on these questions.  Finally, Part III analyzes the 2011 
instruments and considers their legality under both international and domestic 
law. 
I conclude that the legality of the measures is doubtful in international law 
– at least in so far as “out-bound” information sharing is concerned – and 
domestic criminal culpability and constitutional validity are very close questions.  
Even more perniciously, the directions operate in obscurity and there is no 
systemic way for those outside of the security sectors to unearth how they have 
been used, making a challenge to the policies extremely difficult. 
                                                





Part I:  Dilemmas in International Information Sharing 
 
Unexpectedly, information-sharing between states has been one of the most 
difficult legal and policy issues in the post-9/11 national security law environment.   
This issue figured prominently in the Maher Arar commission of inquiry’s 
key findings. There, the RCMP’s ill-considered provision to American authorities 
of raw information, along with sensationalist commentary on the putative 
affiliation with al-Qaeda of Mr. Arar and his wife Monia Mazigh, was the likely 
cause of Arar’s rendition to Syria, a state in which he was tortured.4  
Although critical of the performance of the RCMP on the specifics of the 
Arar case, Justice O’Connor nevertheless underscored the importance to national 
security of international information-sharing.5  As academic analysts have asserted, 
this practice permits the “acquisition of intelligence that is valuable to decision 
makers but otherwise unobtainable at an acceptable cost.”6  As such, it is 
particularly important for small countries, able to use alliance relationships to tap 
into the intelligence capacities of larger states.   
                                                
4  Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public 
Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) [Arar inquiry, Factual Report].  
5  Ibid. at 22. 
6  James Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing,” (2007) 
27(2) Journal of Public Policy 151 at 157.  See also discussion in Craig Forcese, “The Collateral 
Casualties of Collaboration: The Consequence for Civil and Human Rights of Transnational 
Intelligence Sharing,” in Hans Born, Ian Leigh, Aidan Wills (eds), International Intelligence 
Cooperation: Challenges, Oversight and the Role of Law (Routledge, 2010). 
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More than that, intelligence-sharing in the anti-terrorism area now has an 
international legal imprimatur.  In Resolution 1373 (2001), the UN Security 
Council employed its UN Charter Chapter VII powers to decide that all states must, 
among other things, “take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of 
terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange 
of information … [and] afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in 
connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the 
financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in 
their possession necessary for the proceedings.” 7 As a result, information-sharing 
is now a mandatory counterterrorism obligation. 
Nevertheless, there are countervailing human rights considerations.  In 
Justice O’Connor’s words, “the need to investigate terrorism and the need to 
comply with international conventions relating to terrorism do not in themselves 
justify the violation of human rights.”8  
In practice, states have not found it simple to strike a balance between the 
need to share information and the obligation to manage the pernicious human 
rights impacts of that exchange.  Speaking generally, the difficulties posed by this 
sort of inter-agency cooperation can be divided into those associated with in-
bound intelligence sharing and those associated with out-bound exchanges.  “In-
bound” refers to circumstances in which Canadian officials obtain information 
                                                
7  S/RES/1373 (2001), at para. 2(b) and (f).  
8  Ibid 346. 
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from a foreign service.  “Out-bound” is simply the inverse: the provision of 
information by Canadian government bodies to foreign interlocutors.   
 
A. In-Bound Information Sharing 
Information provided by foreign government may be suspect on human 
rights grounds – most notably, it may have been secured through unpalatable 
methods such as torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading (CID) treatment.  For 
instance, in the Arar inquiry, Justice O’Connor criticized CSIS for failing to assess 
the reliability of information extracted by Syrian authorities from Mr. Arar, and 
for failing to warn other agencies when distributing that information that it could 
have been produced by torture. CSIS relied on this information at least twice, to 
Mr. Arar’s detriment.9  
Similar criticisms were directed at Foreign Affairs and the RCMP,10 
sparking Justice O’Connor’s recommendation that “Canadian agencies should 
accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only 
after proper consideration of human rights implications. Information received 
from countries with questionable human rights records should be identified as 
such and proper steps should be taken to assess its reliability.”11 
                                                
9  Arar inquiry, Factual Report at 198. 
10  Ibid at 34. 
11  Ibid at 348. 
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Since the Arar matter, there have been a number of other controversies 
associated with in-bound intelligence.  For example, individuals caught up in the 
related Almalki matter allege, among other things, that the RCMP characterized 
several other Muslim Canadians as “Islamic extremist individuals” suspected of Al 
Qaeda affiliations and obtained search warrants on the basis of statements made 
by one of these individuals under torture in Syria.12   
Evidence procured by torture has also been at issue in several of the 
controversial immigration “security certificate” cases.  In 2010, for instance, the 
Federal Court concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that at 
least some of the information used by the government in the Mahjoub security 
certificate matter was obtained by a foreign service through use of torture.13 
  
B. Out-Bound Information Sharing 
The Arar inquiry pointed to another troubling aspect of transnational 
information-sharing: the inability to control information supplied by the Canadian 
government, once conveyed to a foreign agency.  This matter arose also in the 
subsequent Iacobucci inquiry, examining the mistreatment of Adbullah Almalki, 
Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin. There, commissioner Iacobucci 
concluded that Canadian officials indirectly contributed to the maltreatment of 
these individuals in foreign custody when they shared information about the 
                                                
12  Almalki v. Canada (Attorney General) 2012 ONSC 3023 at para. 6. 
13  Mahjoub (Re) 2010 FC 787. 
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detainees (especially suspected terrorist involvement) and/or communicated 
suspicions in the form of efforts to interrogate the individuals, or to have them 
questioned by the foreign officials.14 
In the Arar case, the RCMP failed to abide by its own policy by not 
attaching caveats to the information provided to American authorities.15  Provisos 
that purport to exert what is known as “originator control”16 over information and 
limit the use to which the recipient agency can put the data, these caveats are 
only a starting point.  They are effective only where foreign agencies choose to 
abide by them.  These agencies may do so out of self-interest, fearing that a 
failure to honour these conditions will stall future information sharing. It seems 
unlikely, however, that a country with limited foreign intelligence capacities, such 
as Canada, would detect that tacit information sharing in violation of caveats. 
Further, information is inherently fungible, and can seep into decision-making in 
ways that can never be traced. Caveats are not, in other words, a guarantor that 
information will be used properly.  
In these circumstances, Canadian authorities may have to be circumspect in 
how they share information with problematic foreign agencies. The government, 
for instance, may have to withhold reliable information concerning the terrorist 
affiliations of a suspect in foreign custody, if disclosure is likely to induce torture 
                                                
14  Government of Canada, Honourable Frank Iacobucci, Report, Internal Inquiry into the 
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed 
Nureddin (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008).  
15  Arar inquiry, Factual Report at 339. 
16  For a discussion of this concept and the related third-party rule, see Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Khawaja, 2007 FC 490 at para. 139 et seq.   
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or other human rights abuses.  In 2006, CSIS’s review body, the Security and 
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), expressed concern that “even though CSIS 
was fully compliant in providing certain information to a foreign agency, this 
could have contributed to that agency’s decision to detain a Canadian citizen 
(who was also a CSIS target) upon arrival in that foreign country.”17 It also noted 
“that questions submitted by CSIS to this agency via a third party may have been 
used in interrogating a Canadian citizen in a manner that violated his human 
rights.”18  
While not identified by SIRC, the person in question was almost certainly 
Maher Arar.  SIRC recommended that CSIS “amend its policy governing the 
disclosure of information to foreign agencies, to include consideration of the 
human rights record of the country and possible abuses by its security or 
intelligence agencies” and that it “review its procedures so that the parameters 
and methods of exchange – as well as the Service’s expectations – are 
communicated to the foreign agency prior to entering into new foreign 
arrangements.”19 
In the Arar Inquiry itself, Justice O’Connor concluded that   
 
[i]nformation should never be provided to a foreign 
country where there is a credible risk that it will cause 
                                                
17  Canada, SIRC, Annual Report, 2006–2006, at 13. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. at 14. 
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or contribute to the use of torture. Policies should 
include specific directions aimed at eliminating any 
possible Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the 
risk of other human rights abuses and ensuring 
accountability.20 
 
Part II: Key Legal Issues in Information Sharing 
 
These information-sharing controversies and discussions arise in a particular legal 
context. In some respects, the legal issues associated with “in-bound” information 
sharing are the simplest, although the moral dilemmas are most acute.  In 
comparison, the legal rules governing “out-bound” transfers require especially 
careful parsing. 
A. Law and In-bound Information Sharing 
1. Torture as Evidence 
International law prohibits extreme forms of interrogation such as torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Two broadly ratified international 
treaties include a prohibition on both torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment (“CID treatment”). The International Covenant on 
                                                
20  Arar inquiry, Factual Report at 345. 
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)21 provides in Article 7 that “no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“Torture Convention”)22 includes more detailed 
prohibitions.  As well as requiring states to criminalize torture and barring CID 
treatment, the Torture Convention provides in Article 15 that “each State Party 
shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result 
of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a 
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”  
This is a sweeping ban. As the then-United Kingdom House of Lords ruled 
in A v. Secretary of State, the Article “cannot possibly be read … as intended to 
apply only in criminal proceedings. Nor can it be understood to differentiate 
between confessions and accusatory statements, or to apply only where the state 
in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are held has inflicted or been complicit in 
the torture.”23  Tortured evidence is inadmissible in all legal proceedings, an 
approach also followed (for federal proceedings) in Canada’s reception of the rule 
in section 269.1 of the Criminal Code.   
Canada’s immigration law goes one step further in limiting the sorts of 
evidence that may be deployed in immigration security certificates.  That law 
                                                
21  999 UNTS 171, entered into force in 1976 (ICCPR). 
22  A/RES/39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), 
entered into force 26 June 1987 [Torture Convention]. 




affirms the Criminal Code’s prohibition on tortured evidence and extends it also 
to information that is believed on reasonable grounds to have been obtained 
through the related concept of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.24 
Even in the absence of these frank limitations, some tortured evidence 
would be excluded from Canadian civil or criminal court proceedings by simple 
common law limitations on the admissibility of confessions extracted from the 
accused themselves through abusive tactics.25  Similarly, the Charter supplements 
statutory law constraints on the use of evidence produced by torture.  Section 7 of 
the Charter protects against deprivation of life, liberty and security of the person 
in violation of “fundamental justice”.  Section 11(d), meanwhile, guarantees those 
accused of an offence a “fair” trial.  In Hape, the Supreme Court signaled clearly 
that torture evidence would violate these constitutional standards.26 
 
2. Torture and Operational Intelligence 
All of these rules have, however, one thing in common: they relate to the 
                                                
24  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27, s-s.83(1.1).  For the leading 
case applying this provision, see Majoub (Re) 2010 FC 787, discussed further below. 
25  See discussion in R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 47 (“The common law 
confessions rule is well-suited to protect against false confessions. While its overriding concern is 
with voluntariness, this concept overlaps with reliability. A confession that is not voluntary will 
often (though not always) be unreliable”). The issue of voluntary confessions has arisen in the 
terrorism context in Australia. See, e.g., R. v. Thomas, 2006 VSCA 165 (Supreme Court of Victoria 
– CA, Australia) (dismissing a terrorism case on the basis of the inadmissibility of evidence 
obtained by interrogators while the suspect was incarcerated in Pakistan and where Australian 
officials suggested that the assistance of Australia could only be procured by cooperation). 
26  R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para. 109. 
TOUCHING&TORTURE&WITH&A&TEN&FOOT&POLE&
 14 
use of information in a judicial or quasi-judicial setting.  They are silent on use of 
information in a purely operational environment.  Manfred Nowak, the former UN 
special rapporteur on torture and co-author on the leading treatise on the Torture 
Convention, concludes that Article 15 does not reach operational use of tainted 
information: “[i]t would indeed by unreasonable to require the police to check the 
possible use of torture by foreign intelligence agencies before exercising their duty 
to prevent terrorist or other attacks and to protect the lives of human beings being 
endangered”.  Such use would not be carried out  
 
in the framework of any proceeding envisaged by 
Article 15. The phrase ‘evidence in any proceeding’ 
only refers to the assessment of evidence before a 
judicial or administrative authority acting in 
accordance with certain rules of taking evidence laid 
down in the respective (criminal, civil or 
administrative) procedural code.27  
 
In the result, the law in this area may leave open an “operational” vs. 
“adjudicative” distinction in the use to which tortured information may be put.   
This is a view sometimes advanced by government figures.  In the United 
Kingdom, then-Home Secretary Charles Clarke concluded that the A and Others 
                                                
27  Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 531-2 (emphasis in original). 
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decision described above “held it was perfectly lawful for such information to be 
relied on operationally, and also by the home secretary in making executive 
decisions.”28  In fact, two law lords in that case did address the issue, suggesting 
that the executive could (and, in one law lord’s view, must) use even tainted 
information to stave off danger to public safety.29 
Within Canada itself, a CSIS lawyer sparked controversy in March 2009 
testimony before a parliamentary committee with the following statement:  “...do 
we use information that comes from torture [supplied by foreign agencies]? And 
the answer is that we only do so if lives are at stake.” There were, the witness 
continued, “occasional, unusual, almost once-in-a-lifetime situations when that 
kind of information can be of value to the national security of the country.”30 
Subsequently, on May 5, 2010, a second CSIS witness told another 
parliamentary committee that it was possible that some information supplied by 
                                                
28  Charles Clarke, “I welcome the ban on evidence gained through torture,” The Guradian 
(13 December 2005), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/dec/13/terrorism.world.  
29  A and others v. Secretary of State, [2005] UKHL 71 at paras 68-69, Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead (raising a ticking time bomb scenario and indicated that “the government cannot be 
expected to close its eyes to this information at the price of endangering the lives of its own 
citizens. Moral repugnance to torture does not require this”); para. 161, Lord Brown (“Generally 
speaking it is accepted that the executive may make use of all information it acquires: both 
coerced statements and whatever fruits they are found to bear. Not merely, indeed, is the 
executive entitled to make use of this information; to my mind it is bound to do so. It has a prime 
responsibility to safeguard the security of the state and would be failing in its duty if it ignores 
whatever it may learn or fails to follow it up. Of course it must do nothing to promote torture. It 
must not enlist torturers to its aid (rendition being perhaps the most extreme example of this). But 
nor need it sever relations even with those states whose interrogation practices are of most 
concern”). 
30  Canada, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Evidence (March 31, 





Afghan security services to CSIS was the product of torture, which should result in 
the information then being flagged and corroborating evidence sought.  In both 
instances, tortured information could serve as the basis for operational actions, 
albeit with prudential controls such as corroboration. Asked in testimony what 
would happen were it not possible to corroborate tainted information, the May 
2010 CSIS witness observed that “I think the average Canadian would not accept 
that its intelligence service do nothing and let Canadian military or civilians be 
killed because we did nothing.”31 
These comments raise pointed dilemmas, now familiar to most who have 
followed the debates over torture, intelligence-sharing and terrorism since 9/11.  
As is common practice in such discussions, the dilemma is made most acute 
through a hypothetical, in this case one drawn from the actual 1985 Air India 
bombing:  
On June 22, 1985, a CSIS officer receives a telex from a liaison with the 
Indian police that, summarized to its essence, reads: “We have a member of a 
Sikh militant group in our custody and we’ve given him our usual treatment and 
he’s told us there is a bomb in the baggage of Air India Flight 182, scheduled for 
departure soon from Vancouver”.  The officer knows and is right that torture is 
practiced by the Indian police of the era and that the “usual treatment” in this 
missive is a euphemism for torture. Question: Should the officer tip off the RCMP 
                                                
31  Canada, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Evidence (May 5, 





and airport security officials so that the latter may conduct a renewed search the 
baggage for Air India Flight 182?  
If the officer does provide this notice, there has been “use” of or “reliance” 
on the tortured intelligence, but of a very different sort than, for example, using it 
in a judicial proceeding.  This reliance in the airport scenario does not itself 
impair (in any meaningful way) the rights or liberties of a person on the basis of 
tortured evidence.  In these circumstances, and given the “opportunity cost” of 
not using the information (possible death, injury and political fall-out from these 
events), the absolutist view on non-use comes risks prioritizing the prohibition on 
torture over the right to life.   
These views are controversial.  Critics contend that “ticking time bomb” 
type scenarios of these sorts do not happen.  They are probably mostly right 
when referring to the sort of extreme ticking time bomb scenarios portrayed on 
television.  But intelligence insiders do occasionally insist that tainted information 
can point to actual peril, claims that an imbalance of information make difficult to 
counter.32  Put another way, one cannot reasonably deny the possibility that 
information might be received in exigent circumstances. 
Critics also contend that any reliance (of whatever sort) on torture 
amounts to tacit acceptance of the practice and is morally wrong (even when it is 
                                                
32  Debate over this question is legion, especially in relation to US use of “waterboarding” 
during the Bush administration period.  See Peter Baker, “Banned Techniques Yields ‘High Value 




not technically illegal).  The International Commission of Jurists’ Eminent Panel 
on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights put it this way: 
 
This differentiation between the use of information 
obtained by torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, for “legal” and for “operational” 
purposes is problematic for several reasons. It 
undermines the absolute prohibition on torture which 
entails a continuum of obligations – not to torture, not 
to acquiesce in torture, and not to validate the results 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. Secondly, it suggests a water-tight 
distinction between “legal” and “operational” use 
which is probably illusory, and certainly the Panel was 
supplied with examples where information was 
supposedly sought on operational grounds, but 
subsequently relied upon in legal proceedings that 
followed. Thirdly, States have publicly claimed that 
they are entitled to rely on information that has been 
derived from the illegal practices of others; in so doing 
they become “consumers” of torture and implicitly 
legitimise, and indeed encourage, such practices by 
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creating a “market” for the resultant intelligence. In 
the language of criminal law, States are “aiding and 
abetting” serious human rights violations by others.33 
 
Likewise, the UN special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism urged 
in 2009 that “States must not aid or assist in the commission of acts of torture, or 
recognize such practices as lawful, including by relying on intelligence 
information obtained through torture. States must introduce safeguards 
preventing intelligence agencies from making use of such intelligence.”34  
It is indisputable that this can happen: as some of the controversies 
described in Part I demonstrate, states may induce torture through tacit or even 
active encouragement or through out-bound information or queries that draw the 
attention of foreign torturers.  That sort of activity arguably violates the bar of 
complicity with torture found in the Torture Convention, and discussed further 
below. 
It is less clear, however, that entirely passive receipt of shared intelligence 
can properly be analogized to a “marketplace” and that this “marketplace” 
amounts to complicity.  This analogy assumes that even here, a “supplier” is 
                                                
33  Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 




34  UN Human Rights Council, Martin Scheinin, Report to the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, A/HRC/10/3 (4 February 
2009) at para. 53. 
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enticed to torture, not by its own security preoccupation, but to please the state to 
which the information is supplied.  Ultimately, whether this “desire to please” 
arises is an unanswerable empirical question, but there is no reason to believe 
that pleasing foreigners is a dominant or even common reason for torture.  
It is worth pondering a counterfactual: in the event that Canadian 
authorities meticulously observed an absolute ban on operational use of inbound 
torture intelligence, would the Indian police in the hypothetical above stop 
torturing?  At least in the context of the 1985 case study, the answer is almost 
certainly “no” – Indian domestic security and political preoccupations, and not 
some misguided effort to cater to perceived Canadian interests, likely animate the 
maltreatment.  Whether or not Canadian authorities tip off airport security on the 
strength of the Indian intelligence changes nothing. 
 A further objection to the operational use of torture information – voiced 
by critics from civil society and occasionally the security services – is that such 
intelligence is inherently unreliable and thus a poor (and indeed 
counterproductive) source on which to base action.35  Since those subjected to 
torture will say anything to stop the pain, torture produces “false positives” – data 
that turn out to be without merit.  These false positives in turn consume scarce 
                                                
35  See, e.g., the discussion in Duncan Gardham, “Torture is not wrong, it just doesn’t work, 





investigative resources by leading investigators down dead ends or skew 
intelligence assessments where they are deployed in support of conclusions.36  
This too is a persuasive critique, but it is tempting to treat it as an absolute. 
Not every action in response to unreliable information is necessarily counter-
productive.  For instance, redoing a search of baggage on Flight 182 does not fall 
into this category of “resource intensive”. 
All of this is to say that the debate about operational use of in-bound 
intelligence that may be the product of torture is no simple issue, and people of 
utmost good faith may reasonably differ on the issue.  It also seems clear from the 
discussion above that law provides no clear guidance on the proper standard.37 
                                                
36  See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Army, FM 2-22.2 Human Intelligence Collector 
Operations (6 September 2006) at 5-21 (“Use of torture is not only illegal but also it is a poor 
technique that yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce 
the source to say what he thinks the HUMINT collector wants to hear.”), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf.   
37  These sorts of considerations prompted following compromise in the Ottawa Principles on 
Anti-terrorism and Human Rights, a set of guidelines formulated by civil society and academic 
participants at a 2006 conference:   
4.3.2 
Information, data, or intelligence that has been obtained through torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment may not be used as a basis for 
(a) the deprivation of liberty; 
(b) the transfer, through any means, of an individual from the custody of 
one state to another; 
(c) the designation of an individual as a person of interest, a security threat 
or a terrorist or by any other description purporting to link that individual 
to terrorist activities; or 
(d) the deprivation of any other internationally protected human right. 
 
Reproduced in Nicole LaViolette and Craig Forcese (eds), The Human Rights of 
Antiterrorism (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008). 
  Principle 4.3.2 bars in-bound use where that use itself is then associated with the 
impairment of rights and interests.  Put another way, there can be no fruit from the poisoned tree, 
if that fruit is a disadvantage visited on a person. 
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B. Law and Out-bound Information Sharing 
Out-bound information-sharing raises very different legal issues.  There is, for 
instance, no express limitation on such sharing in the Torture Convention.  At the 
same time, Article 4 of that treaty may reach the provision of information that 
induces torture:   
 
Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture 
are offences under its criminal law. The same shall 
apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by 
any person which constitutes complicity or 
participation in torture.38 
 
In the right circumstance, the sharing of information might amount to 
“complicity” or “participation” in torture, and violate this criminal standard. 
“Complicity” and “participation” are not defined terms in the treaty.  Indeed, 
there is little from the drafting history of the Convention that lends precision to 
the concepts, with most attention to the issue seemingly focused on whether 
complicity was broad enough to cover concealment of torture after the fact.39  
Logically, however, “complicity” and “participation” include a range of 
inchoate or near inchoate crimes – that is, crimes that precede the actual infliction 
                                                                                                                                            
 
38  Torture Convention, Art. 4. 
39  Nowak and McArthur, above note 27 at 238. 
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of harm.  The UN Committee Against Torture – the treaty body charged with 
administration of the treaty – has posed questions of state parties concerning their 
criminalization of “complicity” and “participation”.  In 2010, Canada responded to 
such a question by pointing to provisions in the Criminal Code that deem an 
individual a party to a crime, such as counseling and aiding and abetting.40 
The latter offence also exists in international criminal law. The 
International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia has treated aiding and 
abetting as part of customary international law41 and has described its elements as 
follows: 
 
(i) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically 
directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to 
the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, 
extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of 
civilian property, etc.), and this support has a 
substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. ...  
 
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite 
                                                
40  Canada, Canada's response to the list of issues, Review of Canada's Sixth Report on the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by 




41  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1, Judgment (10-12-1998) (ICTY) at para. 
191 et seq. 
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mental element is knowledge that the acts performed 
by the aider and abettor assist [in] the commission of 
the specific crime of the principal. ...42 
 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY recently affirmed that the first 
requirement does not require that the accused specifically direct assistance to the 
criminal conduct per se.  Instead, “under customary international law, the actus 
reus of aiding and abetting ‘consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or 
moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.’”43 
In relation to the second requirement, “knowledge on the part of the aider 
and abettor that his acts assist in the commission of the principal perpetrator's 
crime suffices for the mens rea requirement of this mode of participation.”44  It “is 
not necessary that the aider and abettor...know the precise crime that was 
intended and which in the event was committed. If he is aware that one of a 
number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact 
                                                
42  Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment (25-02-2004) (ICTY) at 
para. 102. 
43  Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al, IT-05-87-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment (23-01-14) (ICTY) at para. 
1649 (emphasis added). 
44  Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment (29-07-2004) (ICTY), at 
paras. 49 and 50.  The Blaskic position on mens rea was recently reaffirmed in Sainovic, IT-05-87-
A, Appeal Chamber Judgment (23-01-14) (ICTY) at para. 1649. 
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committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is 
guilty as an aider and abettor.”45 
This concept has obvious application to out-bound intelligence-sharing.  If 
an intelligence service notifies a partner agency with a history of torture that 
“Person of interest X is believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda and is arriving at 
your airport on the following flight”, this then has a “substantial effect” on the 
occurrence of any torture that may then follow.  The person is on the torturing 
agency’s radar and in its clutches because of the information-sharing.  This fact, 
coupled with knowledge of the torturing service’s propensities and the probability 
of torture, may constitute the international crime of aiding and abetting.   
 Culpability under Canadian law for the same offence would likely require 
something more.  Section 269.1 of the Criminal Code makes torture a crime.  
Meanwhile, the aiding and abetting offence in the Criminal Code reads:  “Every 
one is a party to an offence who (a) actually commits it; (b) does or omits to do 
anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or (c) abets any 
person in committing it.”46   “Aiding” means “to assist or help the actor” while 
abetting includes “encouraging, instigating, promoting or procuring the crime to 
be committed”.47    
In terms of the mental element, the reference to “purpose” in s.21(b) could 
suggest that the accused desire the ultimate outcome.  This is not, however, the 
                                                
45  Ibid. 
46  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.21. 
47  R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at para 14 
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approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.  Instead, “purpose” is 
equated with “intent”, and “does not require that the accused actively view the 
commission of the offence he or she is aiding as desirable in and of itself”.48  The 
Ontario Court of Appeal has subsequently held that the normal meaning of the 
words “purpose” and “intend” “suggests that a person must subjectively advert to 
a specific objective and that he or she, therefore, must have knowledge of the 
facts that constitute that objective”.49  The Supreme Court has described this 
“knowledge” requirement as “knowledge of the perpetrator’s intention to commit 
the crime”.50  This threshold may be reached on a “willful blindness” theory – that 
is, the suspicion of an accused is “aroused to the point where he or she sees the 
need to make further inquiries,” but instead he or she “deliberately chooses not to 
make those inquiries”.51 
But more than knowledge, the accused must intend that his or her actions 
aid or encourage the perpetrator: the assistance must be provided “with the 
intention of helping the (or, a) principal to commit the offence.”52  Mere 
knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal acts or propensities may prompt a 
legitimate inference that the accused intended to assist, but knowledge alone is 
                                                
48  R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 at paras. 31 and 39; Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at para 16. 
49  R v. Helsdon, (2007) 84 OR (3d) 544 (On CA) at para. 28.  The Court of Appeal treated 
aiding and abetting identically, despite the fact only “aiding” includes a reference to “purpose”.  
See also R. v. Almarales, 2008 ONCA 692; R. v. Dooley, 2009 ONCA 910 at para 118 (doing the 
same). 
50  Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at para 18 (emphasis in original). 
51  Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at para 21 (emphasis in original). 
52  R. v. Almarales, 2008 ONCA 692 at para. 66. 
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not enough: “while knowledge can found an inference of intention, it alone 
cannot constitute the requisite mens rea”.53 
Thus, in the scenario described above, domestic culpability only arises 
where intelligence is shared by the Canadian agency with its foreign interlocutor 
with the intent of producing the resulting torture. 
 
C. Past Policy Responses 
As discussed above, international and Canadian law limits (although does 
not fully eliminate) the use of information acquired through mistreatment.  
Security service rules have also attempted to grapple with this problem for more 
than a decade.  Because most of these policies are confidential, and often 
protected under the government’s information security rules, it is not possible to 
provide a full portrait of their sweep and evolution.  Many of these policies have, 
however, been released to this author or others through access to information law.   
 
1. Ministerial Directions 
 
By access request dated 2012, this author received (often redacted) copies 
of “ministerial directions” (sometimes also referred to as “ministerial directives”) 
issued by the minister of public safety and that official’s predecessor to both the 
                                                
53  R. v. Palombi, 2007 ONCA 486 at paras. 18 and 19. 
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RCMP (1950 forward) and CSIS (1984 forward). With several exceptions, the 
following discussion focuses on these “ministerial directions”.  In their 
contemporary guise, these directions are issued by the minister of public safety 
under provisions in both the CSIS and RCMP Acts that empowers the head of 
these agencies to control and manage their services, but “under the direction of 
the Minister”.54  The directions issued by the minister are binding administrative 
instruments, and their issuance is an act of discretion by the Minister.55 
The compilation of documents released by the government in response to 
my access request was incomplete, either through omissions or redactions.56  
However, it is possible to piece together some imperfect sense of the trajectory of 
these policies.  
                                                
54  RCMP Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10, s.5; CSIS Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23, s.6. 
55  CSIS Act s-s.6(2) expressly empowers the minister to issue written directions to the 
Director.  These directions are then exempted from the Statutory Instruments Act.  The minister’s 
authority to issue directions to the RCMP is less emphatic.  One of the released documents is an 
undated instrument entitled “The Directives System” and outlines the then-Solicitor-General’s 
competency and powers to issue ministerial directives under the RCMP Act (section 5 specifies 
that the the RCMP commissioner acts “under the direction of the Minister”).  This document then 
observes “[i]t is left to the direction of the Commissioner [of the RCMP] to incorporate the 
standards of the Directives in appropriate RCMP operational or administrative policies…” and to 
“ensure the confirm of Force policies, procedures and methods to these Directives”.  Directives 
System, paras. 4.1 and 4.2, on file with the author.  Notably, the 2011 direction to the RCMP 
invokes s.5 of the RCMP Act as the basis for the instrument.  Also of note: the more recent 
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, S.C. 2005, c.10, charges the 
Minister of Public Safety with coordinating the activities of the RCMP, CBSA and CSIS, among 
others (s.5) and specifies that the Minister may implement “policies” relating to public safety and 
“facilitate the sharing of information, where authorized, to promote public safety objectives” (s.6). 
56  For instance, CSIS’s review body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, discusses 
ministerial directions in its annual reports that were not released to this author under the Access 
request.  These include the 1996-97 ministerial direction on “information management”.  See 




Early instruments deal with police assistance to foreign nations in the form 
of policy training, consultative and investigative assistance.57  A second instrument 
on “RCMP law enforcement agreements” with, among others, foreign agencies 
specifies that “[w]ith respect to the disclosure of personal information, the 
provisions of the Privacy Act shall be respected.”58  A 2002 instrument on the 
same topic replaces earlier versions and is silent on disclosure or information-
sharing.59 
There is, therefore, no evidence of any ministerial direction on torture and 
information-sharing prior to 2003 – that is, prior to the period in which the 
question became controversial in the wake of the Maher Arar incident.  A 2003 
ministerial direction governing RCMP foreign intelligence and security 
cooperation practices specifies that these arrangements “may be established and 
maintained as long as they remain compatible with Canada’s foreign policy,” 
including consideration of the foreign entity’s “respect for democratic or human 
rights.”60  These arrangements must “respect applicable laws and practices 
relating to the disclosure of personal information”.61  
                                                
57  Ministerial Directive on Police Assistance to Foreign Nations, undated document on file 
with the author.  This instrument pre-dates at least 1994, since the document refers to “External 
Affairs”, a department whose named was changed to Foreign Affairs and International Affairs in 
1993. 
58  Ministerial Directive on RCMP Law Enforcement Agreements (undated, but structured and 
styled like directives from the mid-1980s) at para. 4.5, on file with the author. 
59  Minsiterial Directive on RCMP Agreements (2002), on file with the author. 
60  Canada, Minister of PSEP, Ministerial Direction, National Security Related Arrangements 
and Cooperation (2003), at para. D (released under Access to Information Act and on file with 
the author). 
61  Ibid. 
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The closest equivalent document issued to CSIS and available to this 
author is entitled “Minister Direction for Operations”.  It requires the Service to 
“ensure adequate and consistent handling of information about Canadians when 
collecting, storing, sharing and disclosing information”62 and requires 
arrangements with domestic and foreign partners to “establish their purpose and 
obligations, including the application of privacy…legislation.”63   
Since this document released under access law is undated and deeply 
redacted, it is unclear whether this direction is the one described in the annual 
reports of the Security Intelligence Review Committee.64  Specifically, in 2000-01, 
SIRC reported that the until-then “hodgepodge” of ministerial directions had been 
replaced with a single instrument “covering the entirety of CSIS operations.”65  
Among other things, that document included requirements that “the human rights 
record of the country or agency concerned…be assessed” and that weighed “in 
any decision to enter into a co-operative relationship”.  Likewise, “the applicable 
laws of Canada must be respected and the arrangement must be compatible with 
Canada’s foreign policy”.66 
                                                
62  Ministerial Direction on Operations, Annex A, on file with the author. 
63  Ibid at Annex D. 
64  The May 2010 letter to Richard Fadden, described below, references a “2008 Ministerial 
Direction on Operations”. 
65  Canada, SIRC, Annual Report, 2000-01 at 4 and 8. 
66  Ibid at 5 and 7.  SIRC’s annual reports since 2001 also include brief mentions of the 
following policies contained in this or other instruments: 
• A ministerial direction dealing with foreign agencies and human rights (Canada, SIRC, 
Annual Report, 2010-11 at 22; Canada, SIRC, Annual Report, 2007-8 at 24.) 
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In May 2009, the minister of public safety issued a more specific ministerial 
direction on CSIS information-sharing with foreign agencies.  This document 
provided:  
 
so as to avoid any complicity in the use of torture, 
CSIS is directed to 
• not knowingly rely upon information which is 
derived from the use of torture, and to have in 
place reasonable and appropriate measures to 
identify information that is likely to have been 
derived form the use of torture; 
• take all other reasonable measures to reduce 
the risk that any action on the part of the 
Service might promote or condone, or be seen 
to promote or condone the use of torture, 
including, where appropriate, the seeking of 
                                                                                                                                            
• A ministerial direction dealing with cooperation with foreign security and intelligence 
organizations (Canada, SIRC, Annual Report, 2007-8 at 6.) 
• A ministerial direction dealing with investigations into sensitive sectors (academic, 
political, media, religious, trade union) (Canada, SIRC, Annual Report, 2007-8 at 13.) 
• A ministerial direction dealing with segregation of security screening information from the 
Service’s other information holdings (Canada, SIRC, Annual Report, 2006-7 at 15.) 
• A ministerial direction on “National Requirements for Security Intelligence” (Canada, 




assurances when sharing information with 
foreign agencies.67 
 
2. CSIS Operational Policies 
 
This author has also obtained redacted copies of CSIS’s operational policies 
designed to implement these ministerial directions.  By 2002, CSIS apparently 
completed a review of the foreign agency’s human rights record in assessing 
potential new foreign arrangements pursuant to the 2001 Ministerial Direction on 
CSIS Operations. According to the Service’s operational policies, “if there are 
allegations of human rights abuses, the Service always ensures to use a cautious 
approach when liaising with the foreign agency and closely scrutinizes the content 
of the information provided to, or obtained from, the foreign agency” either “in an 
effort to avoid instances where the security intelligence information exchanged 
with the latter is used in the commission of acts which would be regarded as 
human rights violations” or “to ensure none of the security intelligence 
information exchanged with the latter is used in the commission of acts which 
would be regarded as human rights violations.”68 
                                                
67  Ministerial Direction to the Director Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Information 
Sharing with Foreign Agencies, undated but may date from or around November 2008.  See 
discussion in the CSIS Annual Report, 2008-9, at 28. 
68  CSIS, OPS-402 Section 17 Arrangements with Foreign Governments and Institutions, 
dated 2002-01-28, but apparently still in operation on 2005-06-06, on file with the author 
(emphasis added).   
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In a directive issued in November 2008, the CSIS Deputy Director of 
Operations described the then-extant CSIS policy on information-sharing with 
agencies possessing poor human rights records.  Among other things, that 
directive provides that: “When sharing, seeking or accepting information from a 
foreign agency, employees must consider the record of that agency or the country, 
in regard to its use of mistreatment to collect information. In this respect, 
employees will be expected to be familiar with human rights (HR) agency and 
country profiles.”69  Depending on this assessment, the Service employee must 
follow a process of approval prior to using or sharing the information.  With 
respect to out-bound information sharing, the risk of maltreatment might be 
mitigated by use of a caveat.  A sample CSIS caveat was also released under the 
access request and reads: 
 
Our service is aware that your organization might be 
in possession of threat related information on 
Canadian citizen (name of individual). As we believe 
(name of individual) will be present in your country, 
our Service recognizes the sovereign right of your 
government to undertake reasonable measures under 
the law to ensure your public safety. Should you deem 
some form of legal action against (name of individual) 
                                                
69  CSIS, DDO Directive on Information Sharing with Agencies with Poor Human Rights 
Records (2008-11-19), at 2, on file with the author. 
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is warranted, our Service trusts that (name of 
individual) will be fairly treated within the accepted 
norms of international Conventions, that he is 
accorded due process under law and afforded access 
to Canadian diplomatic personnel if requested. 
Furthermore, should you be in possession of any 
information that originated from our service regarding 
(name of individual), we ask that this information not 
be used to support (name of individual) 's detention or 
prosecution without prior formal consultation with our 
service. 
 
The 2008 policy also makes clear, however, that with proper approval, 
information could be shared, even if the substantial risk of mistreatment could not 
be eliminated or significantly mitigated by a caveat.70  Further information on 
what might guide such a decision is redacted from the document. 
Various accountability bodies have questioned the effectiveness of these 
operational policies.  In its 2004-5 annual report, the Security Intelligence Review 
Committee doubted CSIS could meet the human rights standards expressed in its 
                                                
70  See also press coverage of documents with a similar content obtained by the media on this 
topic.  Jim Bronskill, “CSIS would use tips gained through torture,” Globe and Mail (13 
September 2010) at A4.  
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2002 policy.71  The Federal Court raised equally pressing concerns in relation to 
the 2008 policy.  In Majoub, Justice Blais observed that  
 
[t]he Service appears to rely on the experience of their 
employees to assess and … [filter] information that is 
from a country or agency with a questionable human 
rights record. There is no evidence that employees, 
trained in the art of intelligence collection, have 
specific expertise in assessing whether information 
comes from torture or not. … It is also clear from the 
record that the Service does not have the means to 
independently investigate whether the information is 
                                                
71  SIRC reported in its 2004–5 annual report that at least one of the CSIS foreign 
arrangements that it audited “did not provide an adequate analysis of potential human rights 
issues.” Canada, SIRC, Annual Report 2004–2005 at 35. Further, it objected to CSIS’s claim that 
it “ensures” that information exchanged is not the cause or product of human rights abuses: 
 
the use of the term “ensure” implies that CSIS will make certain 
that the information shared does not lead to—or result from—
acts that could be regarded as human rights violations. However, 
the Committee concluded that CSIS was not in a position to 
provide such an absolute assurance. … Second, while CSIS is 
cautious when sharing information with foreign agencies, it 
cannot determine in all cases how that information is used by the 
recipient agency. Similarly, the Service is rarely in a position to 
determine how information received from a foreign agency was 
obtained. As [former CSIS director] Mr. Elcock stated to the 
[Arar] Commission, when it comes to information that may have 
been the product of torture, ‘the reality is in most cases we would 
have no knowledge that it was derived from torture. You may 
suspect that it was derived from torture, but that is about as far 
as one will get in most circumstances.’71 
Ibid at 25. 
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obtained from torture. Indeed, the evidence of [senior 
CSIS officer] Mr. Vrbanac suggests that the Service is 
ill equipped to conduct an inquiry into the provenance 
of information to ensure that it is not from torture.72 
 
In the result, the Service’s approach was insufficient to “ensure that all the 
information obtained from countries with a poor human rights record meets the 
admissibility criteria” of the immigration security certificate law, mentioned 
above.73 
 




The policies governing CSIS (and RCMP and now Canada Border Services 
Agency) information-sharing have evolved since 2010, in a manner that seems to 
acknowledge more overtly a willingness to share information in exigent 
circumstances, even at the risk of torture.   
                                                
72  Majoub (Re) 2010 FC 787 at paras. 92 to 93.  
73  Ibid at para. 95. 
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 On December 7, 2010, then-minister of public safety Toews wrote a letter 
to then-CSIS director Richard Fadden.  In that letter, he observed “the number 
one national security priority of the Government of Canada has been, and will 
remain for the foreseeable future, the fight against terrorism. In this context, it is 
critical that information be shared quickly and widely among those with the 
mandate and responsibility to disrupt serious threats before they materialize.”74  
The minister characterized his letter as further guidance on the May 2009 
ministerial directive, reiterated his expectation that CSIS must “always ensure that 
its actions do not appear to condone the torture or mistreatment of any individual, 
and that its interactions with foreign agencies accord with this principle” and then 
added a new admonishment: 
 
In exceptional circumstances where there exists a 
threat to human life or public safety, urgent 
operational imperatives may require CSIS to discharge 
its responsibility to share the most complete 
information available at the time with relevant 
authorities, including information based on 
intelligence provided by foreign agencies that may 
have been derived from the use of torture or 
mistreatment. In such rare circumstances, it is 
                                                




understood that it may not always be possible to 
determine how a foreign agency obtained the 
information that may be relevant to addressing a 
threat. It is also understood that ignoring such 
information solely because of its source would 
represent an unacceptable risk to public safely.75 
 
The document was an evident partial re-think of torture and in-bound (but not 
out-bound) intelligence sharing.  The letter also promised a new directive on the 
topic, then under development. 
 Subsequently, the promised ministerial directive, issued in July 2011, 
provided a new “guidance document” for CSIS.  The minister subsequently issued 
essentially identical directions to the RCMP and the CBSA.  The new directives are 
an expression of what appears to be a whole-of-government “framework” for 
“addressing risks of mistreatment in sharing information with foreign entities.”76 
 
B. 2011 Ministerial Directions 
  
                                                
75  Ibid 
76  This document, on file with the author, seems to be directed to the entire Canadian 
security and intelligence community, including the Department of National Defence. 
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The 2011 ministerial directions seem to be the most detailed treatment on 
information sharing and torture issued to date.77  They begin with a section on 
“Canada’s legal obligations”, define several key terms, establish “information 
sharing principles” and then provide a road map for approving both in-bound and 
out-bound information sharing “when there is a substantial risk of mistreatment 
in sharing information”. 
 Having acknowledged the international, statutory and constitutional 
prohibitions on torture discussed above, the instruments define “mistreatment” to 
include both torture and CID treatment or punishment.  “Substantial risk” of such 
treatment means a “personal, present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment” that is 
“real and must be based on something more than mere theory or speculation” that 
typically arises when “it is more likely than not that there will be mistreatment”.  
The latter test is not, however, to be “applied rigidly because in some cases, 
particularly where the risk is of severe harm, the ‘substantial risk’ standard may be 
satisfied at a lower level of probability”. 
 The information-sharing principles applicable to CSIS, RCMP and CBSA 
include an obligation to avoid “complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities” as 
well as a requirement to assess the accuracy and reliability of information 
received from partner agencies.  Approvals for information-sharing are to be 
indexed to the level of risk of mistreatment. 
                                                
77  Then public safety minister Toews issued the CSIS Direction to CSIS on July 28, 2011, and 
to the RCMP and the CBSA on September 9, 2011.  The directions were obtained by journalist Jim 




1. Out-bound Rules  
  
Where the risk of sending or soliciting information from a foreign entity is 
substantial, and it is unclear that the risk can be mitigated by caveats and 
assurances, the CSIS director, the RCMP commissioner or the CBSA president 
decide on the information-sharing.  These officials consider a list of factors in 
arriving at their decisions, including the national security interest, the basis for 
believing a substantial risk exists, measures to mitigate that risk and the views of 
other departments, including Foreign Affairs.  The matter may also be referred to 
the minister.  The minister or the director “shall authorize the sharing of 
information with the foreign entity only in accordance with” the direction and 
“Canada’s legal obligations”.  
 
2. In-bound Rules 
 
 The direction then reiterates the core of the 2010 letter on use of in-bound 
information, noting that in exceptional circumstances CSIS, RCMP and CBSA will 
share information from foreign entities that likely stems from mistreatment: 
“When there is a serious risk of loss of life, injury, or substantial damage or 
destruction of property, CSIS [RCMP or CBSA] will make the protection of life 
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and property its priority.”  As a prudential measure, “[m]easures will also be 
taken to ensure that the information which may have been derived through 
mistreatment is accurately described, and that its reliability is properly 
characterized. Caveats will be imposed on information shared with both domestic 
and foreign recipients to restrict their use of information, as appropriate.” 
 
C. Legality of the 2011 Ministerial Directions 
 
 When reported in the press in 2012, the new directions elicited a hostile 
reception from opposition politicians, and the human rights and legal 
community.78  The 2011 directions represent a shift in emphasis from their closest 
predecessors. The 2009 ministerial direction, for example, seems to bar use of 
inbound torture information – CSIS is not to “knowingly rely upon information 
which is derived from the use of torture” and there is no emphatic instruction 
allowing out-bound sharing that might contribute to torture.  At the same time, it 
is also clear that CSIS operational policies implementing these directions have 
overpromised by asserting unverifiable and implausible guarantees that shared 
                                                
78  See, e.g., Jim Bronskill, “CSIS can share info despite ‘substantial’ torture risk,” Toronto 
Star (02 March 2012), available at 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/03/02/csis_can_share_info_despite_substantial_tort
ure_risk.html; Jordan Press, “Torture risk 'must be real,' directive says; Government on defensive 
over information-sharing edict,” Ottawa Citizen (03 March 2013) at A3; Kent Roach, “Canada 
plays a dangerous game,” Ottawa Citizen (7 March 2012) at A.13.  Kent Roach, “The Dangerous 
Game of Complicity in Torture,” (2012) 58 (3 & 4) Criminal Law Quarterly 303.  More recently, 
the direction was condemned by a resolution adopted by council at the 2013 Canadian Bar 




information was not the product, or a contributing cause, of torture, and have 
also held the door open to information sharing even in the face of substantial risk 
of mistreatment. 
 The 2011 directions may be an honest rendition of longstanding 
government practice in at least some agencies, consolidating more tacit and less 
regimented practices into a single code of conduct for the three key security and 
intelligence services within the minister of public safety’s portfolio.  At core, they 
provide a high-level system of approval for in-bound or out-bound information 
sharing tied to torture, where the stakes are high enough.  In this respect, they 
satisfy some of the expectations announced in 2010 by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism.  In that expert’s compilation of human rights good 
practices for intelligence services while countering terrorism, he calls for a solid 
legal grounding for intelligence exchanges, complete with approval processes and 
safeguards.79  In this respect, the ministerial directions seem to constitute an 
improvement.  Still, as discussed below, UN experts have raised doubts about the 
legality of directions that open the door (at least in principle) to information-
sharing even where there is substantial risk of mistreatment.  
 To be clear, the directives do not oblige “out-bound” harm-inducing 
                                                
79  UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while  countering terrorism, Martin 
Scheinin: Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that 
ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on 
their oversight, A/HRC/14/46 (17 May 2010) at paras. 45 et seq. 
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information-sharing to counter national security threats.  Rather, they establish a 
protocol for approving such risky sharing.  They open the door without necessarily 
requiring anyone to walk through it. Everything turns, therefore, on how these 
directions have been used.   
Unfortunately, there is precisely no information on government decision-
making under the directions.  This author filed access to information requests in 
the spring 2013 asking for information on the question, but had received no 
substantive response by the date of this writing.  Given the reach of national 
security-related exemptions and exceptions in the Access to Information Act, it is 
unlikely much will be disclosed.  This is unfortunate, because how the directions 
are used is material to the question of their legality.  Nevertheless, it is possible in 
this Article to consider the legality of the 2011 directions, on their face. 
 
1.  International Legality 
 As the discussion above suggests, distinctions must be drawn between in-
bound and out-bound information-sharing.  In-bound information-sharing is 
subject to Article 15 of the Torture Convention, precluding the use of torture-
induced information as evidence in proceedings.  Both in-bound and out-bound 
information sharing are governed by the requirement that states criminalize 
“complicity and participation” in torture. 
 As discussed above, “complicity” in international criminal law may be best 
captured by the concept of “aiding and abetting”.  The latter is a sweeping 
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concept in international criminal law, possibly reaching conduct in which, e.g., a 
Canadian agency with knowledge of the foreign service’s torturing propensities 
tips off a foreign partner to the presence of a person.  This tip off then facilitates 
that person’s detention and maltreatment.   
 Notably, a pressing national security motivation for this information-
sharing is entirely irrelevant.  The Torture Convention states unequivocally that 
“[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification of torture”.80  Complicity in torture could not, therefore, 
reasonably be forgiven for these sorts of motivations.  
 Outside of an armed conflict situation,81 there is presently no venue in 
which an international prosecution of a Canadian government official complicit in 
torture could occur.  That, of course, does not change the illegality of the action, 
or obviate Canada’s own state responsibility under the Torture Convention were 
these events to arise.  Indeed, in its June 2012 “concluding observations” issued in 
response to Canada’s periodic report on its Torture Convention compliance, the 
UN Committee Against Torture observed as follows: 
 
                                                
80  Torture Convention, Art. 2. 
81  Under the Rome Statute, creating the International Criminal Court, simple torture is not a 
crime over which the court has jurisdiction.  However, torture and more indirect forms of 
participation in torture may be a “war crime” if they arise in an armed conflict situation.  Note, 
however, that the Rome Statute standard for aiding and abetting in prosecutions brought to the 
ICC is “purpose”, different from the “knowledge” requirement that likely exists in customary 
international law.  See Rome Statute, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 25(3)(c). 
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17. While taking note of the State party’s national 
security priorities, the Committee expresses its serious 
concern about the Ministerial Direction to the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which 
could result in violations of article 15 of the 
Convention in the sense that it allows intelligence 
information that may have been derived through 
mistreatment by foreign States to be used within 
Canada; and allows CSIS to share information with 
foreign agencies even when doing so poses a serious 
risk of torture, in exceptional cases involving threats to 
public safety, in contravention to recommendation 14 
from the Arar Inquiry (arts. 2, 10, 15 and 16). 
 
The Committee recommends that the State party 
modify the Ministerial Direction to CSIS to bring it in 
line with Canada’s obligations under the Convention. 
The State party should strengthen its provision of 
training on the absolute prohibition of torture in the 
context of the activities of intelligence services.82 
 
                                                
82  UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against 
Torture: Canada, CAT/C/CAN/CO/6 (25 June 2012) at para. 17. 
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The Committee adverts to the possibility of non-compliance raised by the 
ministerial direction, not to the inevitability that it will be used.  In that respect, 
the Committee operated in the same factual vacuum as this article. However, in 
the event the directive was used to share information in the manner feared, it 
seems clear from its language that the Committee would consider Canada in non-
compliance with its Torture Convention obligations. 
It is not entirely clear what legal construal of the Convention would 
support that conclusion.  As is typical, the Committee is opaque in its legal 
reasoning.  In respect to out-bound use, it does not expressly cite any relevant 
Convention rule.  As noted, however, “complicity” would be the most likely legal 
basis for Committee condemnation of Canada. 
For in-bound, the Committee invokes Article 15 but does not distinguish 
between evidentiary and operational use of intelligence.  It may be that the 
Committee does not agree that such a distinction is defensible, giving rise to an 
expansive reading on the language in Article 15.  As the discussion above suggests, 
such a conclusion would be inconsistent with those of Manfred Nowak, the former 
UN special rapporteur on torture and co-author on the leading treatise on the 
Torture Convention.  
 




a) Criminal Law 
 
 The Torture Convention obligations have been received into Canadian 
criminal law.  As described above, torture is a crime, as is aiding and abetting 
torture.  However, the reach of Canada’s aiding and abetting provision appears 
less sweeping than is the case with its international analogue.  Mere knowledge is 
not enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement.  There must also be intent to 
help the torturer commit the offence. 
 There is nothing on the face of the 2011 ministerial directive that connotes 
such intent – indeed, the directive contains language condemning torture.  It is 
therefore difficult to see how information-sharing done with the intent of 
inducing torture would be compliant with the directive, and anything other than 
aberrant and patently criminal activity. 
 Still, there are other criminal offences that might (at least theoretically) 
come into play where information is shared in knowledge of the likely 
consequences.  Criminal negligence causing bodily harm, for instance, carries a 
possible sentence of ten years.83  Criminal negligence is an act or omission that 
“shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons”.84 
Wanton means “‘heedlessly’ … ‘ungoverned’ and ‘undisciplined’ … or an 
‘unrestrained disregard for the consequences’”, while “reckless” means “‘heedless 
                                                
83  Criminal Code, s.221. 
84  Criminal Code, s.219. 
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of consequences, headlong, irresponsible.’”85  Wanton and reckless behaviour 
arises where there is a “marked and substantial departure” from the norm.86 
While the jurisprudence is less than crystal clear, the test for the mental 
element of this offence requires a court to “consider whether the accused either 
adverted to the risk involved and disregarded it, or failed to direct his or her mind 
to the risk and the need to take care at all. In most cases, the mental element can 
be inferred from the accused's conduct or omission.”87 
It would be no answer to a charge under this provision that the harm was 
visited on the victim overseas.  An act conducted in Canada with consequences 
that befall and individual outside of Canada nevertheless lies within the criminal 
jurisdiction of Canadian courts.88   
At one level, application of the 2011 ministerial directives directly as 
intended constitutes a step-by-step path to culpability for criminal negligence 
causing bodily harm.  That is, the directive anticipates the possibility of out-bound 
information-sharing even in the face of an express realization of a “personal, 
present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment” that is “real and … based on 
something more than mere theory or speculation”.  A real risk is, in other words, 
                                                
85  R v. J.L., (2006) 204 C.C.C. (3d) 324 (Ont. CA) at para. 19, citing R. v. Menezes, [2002] 
O.J. No. 551 at para 72 (citations omitted). 
86  R. v. J.F., 2008 SCC 60 at paras. 9 and 16.  
87  R.v. M.R., 2011 ONCA 190 at para 30. 
88  Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178 at para. 74 (describing a “real and substantial 
link” test for jurisdiction in a criminal case: “all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the 
jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took 
place in Canada”). 
OSGOODE&LEGAL&STUDIES&RESEARCH&PAPER&SERIES&
 49 
discounted.  If sharing is authorized “heedless of these consequences”, a plausible 
case exists that this is reckless behaviour.   
Obviously, this is not the typical criminal negligence case involving, for 
example, a car crash and marked departure from the conduct of the reasonable 
automobile driver.  Instead, at issue is the novel question of whether criminal 
negligence can arise through the execution of a government policy that is causally 
linked to (an internationally condemned) harm inflicted by a third party on an 
individual.   
It is not clear how a court would decide this question.  As already noted, 
however, information-sharing done despite the very real prospect of maltreatment 
would clearly deviate dramatically from the standards articulated by the Arar 
Commission.  It would also depart from what the UN Committee Against Torture 
sees as Canada’s international human rights obligations.  As I argue below, it is 
also conduct I believe to be inconsistent with constitutional expectations.  In these 
respects, application of the policy may be described as a marked departure from 
such standards as do exist, a conclusion that would ground a claim to criminal 
negligence. 
The countervailing national security imperative driving the information-
sharing does not change this fact, although it might be the basis for a defence.  
The common law defence of “necessity” is the most likely suspect, albeit a concept 
rarely available in practice.  Necessity is an excuse (although not an ex ante 
justification) for noncompliance with the criminal law “in emergency situations 
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where normal human instincts, whether of self-preservation or of altruism, 
overwhelmingly impel disobedience.”89 Compliance with the law must also be 
“demonstrably impossible.”90 Finally, there must be proportionality “between the 
harm inflicted and the harm avoided.”91  
Notably, the defence is available “in urgent situations of clear and 
imminent peril,”92 and the Supreme Court has frowned on efforts to justify a 
premeditated plan on a necessity basis.93  The ministerial directive cannot, 
therefore, itself be envisaged as a “standing” defence to criminal culpability.  For 
one thing, that directive does not purport to provide this cover – indeed, it 
specifies that information-sharing should be compliant with the law.  For another, 
there is no support for the notion that criminal culpability can be waived by 
executive fiat, and without a statutory exemption.   
It is conceivable, however, that an actual use of the policy might meet the 
strict requirements of necessity, on the specific facts relating to this use.  
Emergencies may arise.  Still, the actions of the official charged with the offence 
would be gauged on an objective standard94 – was, in fact, compliance with the 
law impossible and was the harm at issue proportionate to the torture visited on 
the victim?  The defendant must place before the court sufficient evidence raising 
                                                
89  R. v. Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 248. 
90  Ibid at 251. 
91  R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 28. 
92  Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 244 and 251. 
93  R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 at paras. 40 and 41. 
94  R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 at para. 57; R v. Ryan, 2013 SCC 3 at para. 74. 
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the issue, after which the Crown must demonstrate the inapplicability of the 
concept beyond a reasonable doubt.95   
This is a modest burden on the defendant.  However, given the nature of 
the matters at hand, evidence supporting the defendant’s position would almost 
certainly be highly sensitive, and of a sort the government is loath to disclose in 
open court.  Put another way, it may be difficult for a defendant to table evidence 
sufficient to meet even the limited threshold imposed on him or her. 
This criminal law discussion is entirely speculative, of course.  Indeed, it 
raises the somewhat unworldly prospect of police investigating police or security 
services, followed by the Crown prosecuting its agents, all for applying a direction 
imposed by a political minister.  At the very least, however, this analysis points to 
the conundrums use of the policy might create, and the risks imposed on those 
who follow the policy. 
 
b) Constitutional Law 
The constitutional question is equally complex.  At core, the issue boils down, first, 
to the applicability of the Charter to conduct under the ministerial directions and, 
second, to the precise scope of the Charter right in question.  
i) Charter Applicability 
 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits torture by barring cruel and 
                                                
95  Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 257. 
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unusual treatment or punishment, a category in which torture falls.96  Moreover, 
as already noted, a section 7 “security of the person” interest is triggered by the 
administration of torture.  This includes torture visited on a victim by a foreign 
government.  As the Supreme Court observed in Suresh,  
 
the guarantee of fundamental justice applies even to 
deprivations of life, liberty or security effected by 
actors other than our government, if there is a 
sufficient causal connection between our government's 
participation and the deprivation ultimately effected. 
… At least where Canada's participation is a necessary 
precondition for the deprivation and where the 
deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence of 
Canada's participation, the government does not avoid 
the guarantee of fundamental justice merely because 
the deprivation in question would be effected by 
someone else's hand.97 
 
 Suresh, and an earlier case standing for similar principles in the death 
penalty context,98 involved potential victims in the custody of Canada facing 
                                                
96  Suresh v. Canada, 2002 SCC 1 at para. 51. 
97  Ibid at para. 54. 
98  United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7. 
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removal to jurisdictions where they might be harmed.  The 2011 ministerial 
directives at issue in this article raise a different situation: the flow of information 
that induces mistreatment of a victim in (or who then falls into) foreign custody.  
At first issue in deciding the relevance of the Charter is, therefore, whether it 
matters where the victim is at the time the government sets in train events that 
lead to his or her mistreatment. 
 In this regard, the Court in Suresh did not constrain the Charter-triggering 
“causal connection” between government action and harm to circumstances in 
which the victim (and not just information) moves across borders.  There is, 
therefore, certainly no reason in principle to view the causal doctrine as confined 
to immigration or other removals of persons from Canada.  In relation to the 2011 
ministerial directive, the harm-initiating conduct (information-sharing or the 
authorization for such sharing) is itself undertaken in Canada, and the fact that 
the injury manifests overseas should not somehow sanitize the government’s 
action.  That approach would be consistent with criminal law approaches to 
transnational jurisdiction where elements of the wrong straddle borders.99  
From this perspective, there is nothing at all extraterritorial about the 
application of the Charter – it is applied to conduct in Canada, undertaken by the 
Canadian government or its agents.  However, even if these events were perceived 
as extraterritorial in reach, the Supreme Court’s dicta in Hape and Khadr suggest 
that the Charter does attach to extraterritorial conduct where Canada’s 
                                                
99  See Libman, [1985] 2 SCR 178, discussed in above note 88. 
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international human rights obligations are also in play.100  As noted above, the UN 
Committee Against Torture is persuaded that the ministerial directive is governed 
by Canada’s Torture Convention obligations, regardless of where victims may be 
located.  This may not be definitive conclusion.  It does, however, stand to reason 
that Canada cannot disregard its international human rights obligations by 
arguing that the torturer with whom it is “complicit” acts outside of Canada. 
There is a perplexing line of Federal Court jurisprudence that purports to 
limit the extraterritorial reach of the Charter to circumstances where the harm is 
visited on a Canadian citizen.101  There is reason to doubt this particular construal.  
Although the facts in Khadr involved a Canadian citizen detained overseas, and 
the Supreme Court does mention this, there is no clear citizenship limiter in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Indeed, it would be impossible to reconcile such 
a limiter with the Court’s admonishment that the Charter incorporates Canada’s 
international human rights obligations.  The nationality of victims of human rights 
abuses does not determine the reach of international human rights law.  Further, 
the Federal Court cases involve (at least in part) conduct by Canadian officials 
physically located overseas.  This fact should distinguish those cases from 
                                                
100  Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para. 90 (concerning whether Canadian police need to observe 
Charter obligations while operating abroad and concluding that the Charter will not reach this 
conduct unless officers were “participating in activities that, though authorized by the laws of 
another state, would cause Canada to be in violation of its international obligations in respect of 
human rights”); Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 at para.2 (“The principles of 
international law and comity of nations, which normally require that Canadian officials operating 
abroad comply with local law, do not extend to participation in processes that violate Canada’s 
international human rights obligations”). 
101  Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces), 2008 FCA 401; Slahi v. 
Canada (Minister of Justice), 2009 FCA 259. 
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circumstances where officials execute a policy in Canada whose consequences 
then are aimed across borders.   
Still, the Federal Court in Slahi suggested that section 7 of the Charter 
would not apply in circumstances where a foreign national was detained by a 
foreign government in an internationally wrongful manner because of information 
provided by and from Canada, unless it could also be shown that Canada 
participated in the actual detention “contrary to its international law 
obligation”.102  
The Supreme Court has so far declined to pronounce on these issues and 
will at some juncture need to decide whether it really meant what it said in 
identifying international human rights law as the index of Canada’s 
extraterritorial obligations.  Affirming that position hardly opens the floodgates – 
Canada’s international human rights obligations do not themselves have endless 
extraterritorial reach.103   
For the purposes of this Article, however, the situation raised in Slahi 
should be distinguished from that prompted by the ministerial directives and their 
application.  Detention is not per se a wrongful act – the nature and 
circumstances of the detention are what matters in deciding lawfulness.  In 
comparison, torture is an inherent wrong in every circumstance, and more than 
that, international law requires the criminalization and prosecution of complicity 
                                                
102  Slahi v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2009 FC 160 at para. 52, aff’d (without mention 
of this issue), 2009 FCA 259. 
103  For discussion, see Craig Forcese, National Security Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 
28 et seq.   
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in torture.  If Canada’s sharing of information amounts to complicity – a serious 
prospect as measured against the sweeping aiding and abetting concept in 
customary international law – then by definition Canada is actively participating 
in the international wrong.  The Federal Court’s condition that Canadians 
participate in the actual wrong in violation of Canada’s international obligations is 
thereby satisfied. 
In sum, it would be implausible to conclude that the government has a 
Charter carte-blanche to share information in knowledge of likely torture so long 
as only foreigners (and not Canadians) are then harmed in foreign facilities.  It is 
hard to see how such a jurisdictional exclusion could possibly be treated as 
anything other than an arbitrary construal of the Charter, unmooring it from 
international law. 
 
ii) Charter Requirements 
 
The constitutionality question is not, however, answered by simply 
asserting “the Charter applies”.   A second issue is whether a court would 
exonerate particular decisions to share on the basis of an attenuated read of the 
actual substantive section 7 requirements, or under exigent circumstances 
pursuant to section 1.  
In Suresh itself, the Supreme Court declined to  
exclude the possibility that in exceptional 
circumstances, deportation to face torture might be 
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justified, either as a consequence of the balancing 
process mandated by s. 7 of the Charter or under s. 1. 
(A violation of s. 7 will be saved by s. 1 “only in cases 
arising out of exceptional conditions, such as natural 
disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics and the 
like”…). We may predict that it will rarely be struck in 
favour of expulsion where there is a serious risk of 
torture.  However, as the matter is one of balance, 
precise prediction is elusive.  The ambit of an 
exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, 
must await future cases.104 
 
This “Suresh exception” is irreconcilable with the relevant international 
obligations, which (as the Court acknowledged) “rejects deportation to torture, 
even where national security interests are at stake”.105  Still, this “exceptional 
conditions” language may be the inspiration for the potentially permissive 
position on information-sharing taken in the 2011 ministerial direction.   
However, the persistence of the Suresh exception as good law may be 
doubted.  For one thing, the Supreme Court has since been clear in (reasserting) 
that international law provides the standard against which Charter rights are to be 
measured.106  If it means what it says, it has therefore already tacitly closed the 
door on the Suresh “exception” in the context of removals to torture.  As already 
noted, the bar in international law on removals to torture is absolute.   
                                                
104  Suresh, 2002 SCC 1 at para. 78. 
105  Ibid at para. 75. 
106  This approach was first raised in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 1038, at 1056.  It has been resuscitated by Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para 56 (“[i]n 
interpreting the scope of application of the Charter, the courts should seek to ensure compliance 
with Canada’s binding obligations under international law where the express words are capable of 
supporting such a construction”) and in cases such as Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47 at para. 25 (describing international human rights 
treaties as the minimum level of protection in interpreting Charter rights, in that case s.6). 
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Likewise, it is entirely undecided whether (by analogy) a Suresh-style 
exception extends to section 7 when the provision is triggered, not by a removal, 
but by other circumstances.  Certainly, in Khadr, the Supreme Court did not 
imagine a Suresh-style “exceptional” justification limiting the reach of section 7 
and tied to national security.  Instead, it held that section 7 applied to “Canadian 
officials when they participated in the Guantanamo Bay process by handing over 
the fruits of its interviews with Mr. Khadr”.107   
These Khadr facts are much closer to the issues raised by the 2011 
ministerial directions than are those in Suresh.  There is little reason, therefore, to 
assume that what the Supreme Court said in 2002 in Suresh in relation to 
immigration removals is pertinent, in the least, to the question of section 7 and its 
application to information-sharing that induces foreign maltreatment. 
It is also notable that since Suresh, the Court has held that section 7 rights 
are to be sternly defended and not tempered by an “internal” balancing.  Courts 
are to consider any deviation from section 7 under section 1.  This holding, issued 
in Charkaoui,108 concerned the procedural aspect of section 7, but there is no 
reason to assume that the Court would apply a different standard in the 
application of section 7 fundamental justice’s substantive entitlements.   
As a practical matter, a decision to share information would be examined 
now under the Court’s fused s.1/administrative standard of review approach.  In 
                                                
107  Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 at para. 28. 
108  Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at paras. 22 and 23.  
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the wake of Dore,109 the section 1 analysis in relation to discretionary executive 
action amounts to consideration of “reasonableness”.  In deciding that matter, 
everything would then turn on the facts – was the national security objective 
motivating the sharing information with a torturing agency so pressing as to be 
proportionate with the right violated?110  It would presumably be for the 
government to demonstrate this justification, something that might prove 
awkward given that evidence supporting the government’s contentions may be of 
a highly sensitive nature.  Indeed, the government might prefer to lose the 
constitutional case than disclose information protected by national security 
confidentiality.  More than that, we have not yet had a recent case in which the 
Court was obliged to contemplate whether s.1/reasonableness can be applied in 
any real way to forgive a Charter violation that in term reflects a non-derogable 
and absolute international human rights norm (in this case, the prohibition on 
torture). 
All of this is to say that the sharing of information where there is a risk of 
overseas torture is constitutionally doubtful, and for practical purposes difficult to 
defend. 
Conclusion 
 The 2011 ministerial directions clearly represent a change in official 
                                                
109  Dore v. Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12. 
110  Ibid at para. 57 (“On judicial review, the question becomes whether, in assessing the 
impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory 




positions from those articulated in the aftermath of the Arar matter.  Indeed, as 
the UN Committee Against Torture has observed, they are impossible to reconcile 
with the recommendations of the Arar commission itself. 
 On the other hand, the directions may be a more honest and forthright 
expression of the operational policies in fact employed by, at the very least, CSIS.   
CSIS policies have overclaimed in terms of guarding against information sharing 
tied to torture, while at the same time holding the door open in practice to such 
exchanges.   
 While the new approach is more transparent than its predecessors, this 
does not exonerate its content.  To summarize the chief conclusions of the Article:  
There is a plausible legal basis to distinguish between evidentiary and operational 
use of in-bound information tied to torture.  Moral arguments on this issue are 
pressing and difficult to resolve.  It is, however, likely an overreach to ascribe a 
prohibition on operational use to Article 15 of the Torture Convention or to 
characterize passive consumption of such information by a receiving agency as 
“complicity” under that treaty. 
 On the other hand, the complicity concept in the Convention plausibly 
overlaps with the concept of “aiding and abetting” that international criminal 
tribunals have regarded as part of customary international law.  If so, then use of 
the directives to justify out-bound information sharing, in knowledge of the 
likelihood of torture, may give rise to international criminal culpability and trigger 
Canada’s own state responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct. 
OSGOODE&LEGAL&STUDIES&RESEARCH&PAPER&SERIES&
 61 
 At the same time, Canada’s own “aiding and abetting” concept appears to 
have a different reach, and require a more emphatic intent to assist a torturer.  In 
these circumstances, it is difficult to see how a domestic criminal prosecution for 
aiding and abetting torture could be mounted against (proper) uses of the 
directives.  Criminal negligence for bodily injury may, however, be another story, 
and a concerted application of the 2011 directives by an official within Canada 
would seem to fit the elements of that crime.  If so, an accused would likely need 
to resort to a defence of necessity, pointing to national security exigencies.  
Marshaling even the modest evidence needed to invoke that defence might, 
however, run up against the state’s interest in protecting its secrets. 
 There is also an obvious Charter of Rights and Freedoms issue raised by the 
directives.  Whether the application of section 7 to use of the directive would be 
stymied by preoccupations with extraterritoriality might depend, in one theory, on 
how a court construed past precedent like Suresh and recognized the territorial 
nexus between use of the policy and Canada.  On another theory, the court would 
need to grapple with the confounding jurisprudence on the extraterritorial reach 
of the Charter, and the possible argument that the Charter does not reach harm 
done to foreigners in foreign lands, even when compounded by Canadian conduct.   
If the territoriality issues were, however, overcome, it is difficult to see how 
the government could convert Suresh and its language of “exceptional conditions” 
into a limitation on the substantive reach of section 7.  Put simply, the court has 
progressed in its treatment of the Charter, and now is more earnest in treating 
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compliance with international law as the baseline construal of the Charter.   Put 
another way, behaviour that violates the Torture Convention now seems unlikely 
to pass muster under the Charter.  Even if the courts were prepared to exonerate 
under section 1 for exigent circumstances, proving that exigency would oblige the 
government to table evidence that it would almost certainly wish to retain as 
confidential. 
 These conclusions represent the limit of what can be said based on the 
information now available.  Exactly how the directives will be used in practice 
remains entirely unclear, and definitive conclusions on their legality will depend 
on those facts.  Sadly, those data will be hard to come by.  It is not likely that the 
government will announce its use of the policy, or willingly release information 
on such use under access law.  In the result, a challenge to the policy would 
require a frank challenge to the directions themselves without evidence of their 
use, something that would make the applicant’s case more difficult.  As the 2013 
Canadian Bar Association resolution protesting the directions noted “decisions to 
share information pursuant to the Direction tend to elude judicial review and 
public oversight due to the circumstances in which they are made.”111 
At some level, that is perhaps the most pernicious aspect of a policy 
articulated, not in legislation with reporting obligations, but in the form of 
executive fiat.  Put simply, the public will not know what the state is doing unless 
and until a scandal arises, similar to the one that engulfed Maher Arar.  Until then, 
                                                




we depend on executive good faith and the operations of accountability bodies 
with limited resources and capacities (and in some eyes, credibility), like the 
Security Intelligence Review Committee. 
 Absolute bans on information sharing may be unrealistic, but they are easy 
to implement.  If the government wishes to nuance its approach, it should also 
layer on equivalent procedural distinctions, including periodic public reporting on 
the number of times the directions have been deployed and mandatory provision 
of details to SIRC each time they are.112  Otherwise, in the hothouse of inside-
government thinking, dissenting views may be lost, and the 2011 directions’ 
willingness to touch torture with a 10-foot pole may produce even shorter poles in 
time.   
  
                                                
112  Kent Roach has also made this point.  See Kent Roach, “The Dangerous Game of 
Complicity in Torture,” (2012) 58 (3 & 4) Criminal Law Quarterly 303 at 306. 
